Environmental variability greatly influences the eco-evolutionary dynamics of a population, i.e. it affects how its size and composition evolve. Here, we study a well-mixed population of finite and fluctuating size whose growth is limited by a randomly switching carrying capacity. This models the environmental fluctuations between states of resources abundance and scarcity. The population consists of two strains, one growing slightly faster than the other, competing under two scenarios: one in which competition is solely for resources, and one in which the slow ("cooperating") strain produces a public good that benefits also the fast ("freeriding") strain. We investigate how the coupling of demographic and environmental (external) noise affects the population's eco-evolutionary dynamics. By analytical and computational means, we study the correlations between the population size and its composition, and discuss the social-dilemma-like "eco-evolutionary game" characterizing the public good production. We determine in what conditions it is best to produce a public good; when cooperating is beneficial but outcompeted by freeriding, and when the public good production is detrimental for cooperators. Within a linear noise approximation to populations of varying size, we also accurately analyze the coupled effects of demographic and environmental noise on the size distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
The fate of populations is affected by a number of endlessly changing environmental conditions such as the presence of toxins, resources abundance, temperature, light, etc. [1, 2]. In the absence of detailed knowledge of how external factors vary, they are modeled as external noise (EN) shaping the randomly changing environment in which species evolve. The impact of fluctuating environments on population dynamics has been studied in a number of systems [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] , and several evolutionary responses to exogenous changes have been analyzed [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . In finite populations, internal noise is another important form of randomness, yielding demographic fluctuations of stronger intensity in small populations than in large ones. Internal noise (IN) is responsible for fixation [22] [23] [24] (when one species takes over and others are wiped out) and thus plays an important role in the evolution of a population's composition. Ecological and evolutionary dynamics are often coupled, through an interdependent evolution of the population size and composition [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] . As a consequence, environmental variability may affect the population size and hence the demographic fluctuations intensity, thus coupling EN and IN. The interdependence of environmental noise and demographic fluctuations is particularly relevant for microbial communities, whose properties greatly depend on the population size and on the environment [1, 2]. These populations often experience sudden environmental changes that can drastically affect their size, e.g. by leading to population bottlenecks under which the colony of reduced size is more prone to fluctuations [32] [33] [34] [35] . The coupling between the different forms of randomness therefore generates feedback loops between socio-biological interactions and the en- * Electronic address: m.mobilia@leeds.ac.uk vironment [32, 33, 36, 37] , which results in fascinating ecoevolutionary phenomena such as cooperative behavior. For instance, experiments on Pseudomonas fluorescens showed that the formation and sudden collapse of biofilms promotes the evolution of cooperation [34, 35, 38] . In most studies, however, EN and IN are treated as uncoupled [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] .
Recently, we introduced a model describing a fluctuating population-consisting of a fast strain competing with a slow (cooperating) species, that can produce a public goodevolving under a randomly switching carrying capacity [39] . In this model, demographic fluctuations are coupled to EN, resulting in a significant influence on the species fixation probability and leading to noise-induced transitions of the population size. In the context of the eco-evolutionary dynamics of this model, here we introduce the theoretical concept of "eco-evolutionary game" to characterize the emergence of cooperation in populations of fluctuating size. We study the correlations between the population size and its composition and show that a social dilemma of sorts arises: while the public good production increases the overall expected population size, it also lowers the survival probability of cooperators. In the biologically-inspired setting of a metapopulation of noninteracting communities of varying size, we measure the success of each species in the eco-evolutionary game in terms of its expected long-term number of individuals. We thus determine the circumstances under which public good production (cooperation) is detrimental or beneficial to cooperators, and find the conditions in which it is best to produce the public good. Furthermore, we have devised a linear noise approximation that allows us to accurately characterize the population size distribution and noise-induced transitions in a population whose size fluctuates under the joint effect of coupled demographic and environmental noise.
The next two sections establish our approach: In section II, we introduce our stochastic model; in section III, we outline the properties of the fitness-dependent Moran model and piecewise deterministic Markov processes associated with the model, and review how to combine these to compute the species fixation probabilities. In the following two sections, we present our main results: Section IV is dedicated to the correlations between the population size and its composition, and to the discussion of the emergence of cooperative behavior along with an "eco-evolutionary game" in a population of fluctuation size; in section V, we study the population size distribution within a linear noise approximation. Our conclusions are presented in Sec. VI. Additional information is provided in the Supplementary Material (SM) [40] .
II. MODEL
As in our recent work [39] , we consider a well-mixed population of fluctuating size N (t) = N S (t) + N F (t), consisting of N S individuals of species S and N F of species, or strain, F [42] . The fast-growing strain F has fitness f F = 1, whereas the slow-growing strain S has a slightly lower fitness f S = 1 − s, where 0 < s ≪ 1 denotes the (weak) selection intensity. At time t the fraction of S individuals in the population is x(t) = N S (t)/N (t) and the average population fitness isf = xf S + (1 − x)f F = 1 − sx = 1 + O(1). Here, the evolution of the population size N (t) is coupled to the internal composition x(t) by a global growth rate g(x), and its growth is limited by a logistic death rate N/K(t) [25] [26] [27] 39] . The carrying capacity K(t) is a measure of the population size that can be supported, and is here assumed to vary in time, see below. We specifically focus on two important forms of global growth rates: (i) the pure resource competition scenario g(x) = 1, in which x and N are coupled only through fluctuations; and (ii) the public good scenario in which g(x) = 1 + bx, corresponding to a situation where S individuals are "cooperators" [25] [26] [27] 41 ] producing a public good (PG) that enhances the population growth rate through the benefit parameter 0 < b = O(1), here assumed for simplicity to be independent of s. In the PG scenario, N and x are explicitly coupled, since the changes in the size of the population (ecological dynamics) and those in its composition (evolutionary dynamics) are interconnected. This interplay establishes a form of "eco-evolutionary dynamics" [28, 29] . It is worth noting that, as customary in evolutionary game theory, we assume that mutation rates of the strains are negligible, and we thus characterize the population evolutionary dynamics in terms of the fixation properties [24, 41] .
In this context, the population size and composition change according to the continuous-time birth-death process [26, 68, 69] We model environmental randomness by letting the carrying capacity K(t) switch randomly between K + (abundant resources) and K − < K + (scarce resources), see figure 1(a,b). We assume that K(t) switches at rate ν, according to a time-continuous symmetric dichotomous Markov noise (DMN) [43, 44, 47] ξ(t) ∈ {−1, +1} (or random telegraph noise):
The stationary symmetric DMN has zero-mean ξ(t) = 0 and autocorrelation ξ(t)ξ(t ′ ) = exp(−2ν|t − t ′ |) ( · denotes the ensemble average over the environmental noise) [43, 44] . This is a colored noise with a finite correlation time 1/(2ν) [43, 44, [47] [48] [49] [50] , see section SM-I in SM [40] . As a result, the fluctuating carrying capacity reads
and endlessly switches between K + and K − .
In what follows, we consider that the DMN is stationary: ξ(t) = 0 for t ≥ 0. Hence, the initial carrying capacity is either K − or K + with probability 1/2, and the average carrying capacity is constant:
The DMN models suddenly changing conditions, reflecting several situations in bacterial life, such as cells living at either side of a physical phase transition [1], or in the ever-changing conditions of a host digestive tract. In the laboratory, bacteria can be subjected to complex gut-like environment [54] or simplified stressful conditions, typically through variable exposure to antibiotics [55] [56] [57] . Furthermore, with modern bioengineering techniques it is possible to perform controled microbial experiments in settings allowing for sensible comparisons with theoretical models sharing some of the features considered here (switching environment, time-varying population size, public good production) [16, 17, 30, 36] . As discussed in Section IV.B, the setting where colonies of bacteria are grown in arrays of wells or test tubes [30, 36] , modeled as a metapopulation of communities, is particularly relevant for our purposes.
In this model, the population evolves according to the multivariate stochastic process defined by equation (1)-(4), which obeys the master equation
where
, and similarly for E ± F . Equation (5) fully describes the stochastic eco-evolutionary dynamics of the population, and can be simulated exactly (see Sec. SM-II in SM [40] ).
Importantly, here demographic fluctuations are coupled to the colored non-Gaussian environmental noise [39, 40] and encoded in the master equation (5) . This contrasts with the discrete-time population dynamics of, for example Ref. [18] , where external and internal noises are independent and Gaussian. Simulation results, see figure 1(c) and Ref. [62] (in which N (0) = K , as in all our simulations), reveal that generally N (t) evolves much faster than the population composition. We consider K + > K − ≫ 1 to ensure that, after a transient, N (t) is at quasi-stationarity where it is characterized by its quasi-stationary distribution (N -QSD). The population eventually collapses after a time that diverges with the system size [51, 52] , a phenomenon that can be disregarded for our purposes. Below we study the eco-evolutionary dynamics in terms of the random variables N and x, focusing on the fixation properties of the population and its quasi-stationary distribution.
It is useful to start our analysis by considering the meanfield approximation which ignores all noise (say K = K ).
In this case, the population size N and composition x evolve deterministically according to [26, 27, 39, 53] 
where the dot signifies the time derivative. Equation (7), reminiscent of a replicator equation [24] , predicts that x relaxes on a timescale t ∼ 1/s ≫ 1 and eventually vanishes while, according to equation (6) , N (t) equilibrates to N (t) = O(K) in a time t = O(1).
III. PIECEWISE-DETERMINISTIC MARKOV PROCESS, MORAN MODEL & FIXATION PROBABILITIES
In this section, we review the effects of environmental and demographic noise separately, and compound them to find the fixation probabilities that characterize the population composition. Here, these results provide the necessary background for the discussion in Sections IV and V of our main novel findings.
A. Environmental noise & Piecewise-deterministic Markov process
If the population is only subject to external noise (EN), it follows the bivariate piecewise-deterministic Markov process (PDMP) [58] , defined by (7) anḋ
is the harmonic mean of K + and K − [39] . Equation (8) is a stochastic differential equation with multiplicative DMN ξ of amplitude [40] ; it reduces to the deterministic limit (6) when the EN is removed (i.e.
Although the process is only subject to EN, the global growth rate g(x) couples the evolutionary and ecological dynamics. To simplify the analysis, we introduce an effective parameter q ≥ 0 (see Section III C 2) and assume a constant g ≡ 1 + q [39] , obtaining the single-variate effective procesṡ
with
describing the evolution of a population of size N (t) subject only to EN. According to (9) and (10), each environmental state ξ has a fixed point
After t = O(1), the PDMP is at stationarity, characterized by a stationary probability density function (PDF) p * ν,q (N, ξ) (derived in Section SM-III [40] ). Central for our purposes are the features of the marginal stationary PDF p * ν,q (N ) = p * ν,q (N, ξ) + p * ν,q (N, −ξ), giving the probability density of N regardless of the environmental state ξ:
, (12) with normalization constant Z ν,q . Depending on the sign of the exponent, the distribution may be unimodal or bimodal [39] , but has always support [N * − , N * + ], on which F + ≥ 0 and F − ≤ 0.
B. Internal noise & Fitness-dependent Moran process
Internal noise stems from the inherent stochasticity of individual birth and death events in the population; it ultimately causes fixation (one strain taking over the whole population), and hence determines the long-term population composition. When internal and ecological dynamics are coupled, which strain fixates has consequences on the population size, making the fixation phenomenon particularly important.
If internal noise is the only source of randomness (constant K), we can study its effects using the fitness-dependent Moran model [22, 23, 41, 59, 60] , with constant size N ≡ K [61] . To keep the population size constant, at each birth corresponds a death. Therefore, x increases by 1/N if an S individual is born and an F dies (SF → SS at rate T 
The corresponding mean-field equation is again (7) . For an initial fraction x 0 of S individuals, in the framework of the Fokker-Planck equation, the fixation probability of S is [22, 23, 41, 68] (see also Section SM-V.A [40] )
The fixation probability of S thus becomes exponentially smaller the larger the population's (constant) size or selection intensity s are; and, notably, is independent of g(x). In the following we assume x 0 = 1/2 and drop the initial condition for notational simplicity: φ| N ≡ φ(x 0 )| N and φ ≡ φ(x 0 ). Clearly, the fixation probability of F is φ| N = 1 − φ| N . In Section SM-V.A [40] , we also outline the main properties of the mean fixation times of the fitness-dependent Moran model. The most relevant for our purposes is the fact that, in both cases b = 0 and b > 0, the unconditional and conditional mean fixation times scale as O(1/s) to leading order when s ≪ 1 and N s ≫ 1.
C. Fixation under switching carrying capacity
The strain S unavoidably goes extinct in the deterministic limit, see equation (7), and has an exponentially vanishing survival probability when K is constant, see equation (S13). However, when the carrying capacity switches, the population undergoes "bottlenecks" that can enhance this probability [39] and alter the long-term average population size. When b = 0, both species compete for the same finite resources, with a slight selective advantage to F . Therefore, N and x are solely coupled by demographic fluctuations. After a time t = O(1), N attains quasi-stationarity where it is distributed according to its N -QSD [62] , that is well described by the PDF of equation (S3) with q = 0. On the other hand, x relaxes on a much slower timescale t ∼ 1/s ≫ 1 and we showed that the mean fixation time scales as O(1/s) to leading order when s ≪ 1 and K s ≫ 1 [39, 40, 53] . As a consequence, as shown in Section SM-V.B [40] , the population experiences, on average, O(ν/s) environmental switches prior to fixation (see figures S6 [40] and 1(c)). When 0 < s ≪ 1 and K − ≫ 1, we can thus exploit this timescale separation and compute the S fixation probability φ by averaging φ| N over the PDF p * ν/s ≡ p * ν/s,0 , with the rescaled switching rate ν → ν/s [39] :
The PDF p * ν/s is sharply peaked at N ≃ K when ν ≫ s, whereas it has two sharp peaks at N ≃ K ± when ν ≪ s. Equation (14) captures the limiting behavior φ ν→∞ − −−− → φ| K when ν ≫ s (many switches prior to fixation), resulting from the self-average of the EN (since ξ(t) ν→∞ − −−− → ξ(t) = 0), as well as φ ν→0 − −− → (φ| K− +φ| K+ )/2 in the regime of rare switching (ν ≪ s), when the environment almost never changes prior to fixation [39] . As shown in figure 2 and detailed in Section SM-IV [40] , equation (14) reproduces the simulation results for the fixation probability of S within a few percent over a broad range of ν values. While S remains less likely to fixate than F , its fixation probability is much higher than in a constant environment (φ ≫ φ| K ): environmental variability considerably offsets the evolutionary bias favoring F . In the public good scenario, g(x) = 1 + bx with 0 < b = O(1), S individuals act as public good producers (cooperators). The higher x, in fact, the higher the reproduction rate of both strains, see equations (2). However, since S bears alone the metabolic cost of cooperation (PG production), it grows slower than F and, deterministically, x decreases. When b > 0, N and x are explicitly coupled, and they do not evolve on separate timescales: N is a fast variable, enslaved to the slow-varying x [62] . To determine the fixation probability, in Ref. [39] we devised an effective approach, based on suitably choosing the parameter q (0 ≤ q ≤ b) and setting g(x) ≡ 1 + q in equation (8) . This decouples N and x in an effective population whose size distribution, at quasistationarity and for any ν, is well described by the PDF (S3). Within this effective theory approach, the fixation probability of S is thus determined similarly to the case b = 0:
As above, As above, this expression simplifies in the limiting regimes of frequent/rare switching:
)/2 when ν ≪ s. We determined the effective parameter q = q(b) for given (K ± , s, b) by matching the prediction of φ (∞) q with the results of simulations (see [39] and SM [40] ). Figure 2 (b) shows that q(b) increases almost linearly with b, and depends weakly on s. Clearly, q(0) = 0 when b = 0, and equation (15) thus reverts to (14) .
Figure 2(c) shows that the effective approach captures the effects of the coupling between N and x for several choices of b and s, over a broad range of ν. As detailed in SM-IV, the predictions of equation (15) agree within a few percent with simulation results when s ≪ 1, while the accuracy deteriorates as s and b increase, therefore lowering φ. In fact, increasing b yields higher q(b), which results in effectively increasing the carrying capacity K ± → (1 + q(b))K ± . In the ν → ∞, 0 limits, this is equivalent to rescaling the selection intensity as s → (1 + q(b))s, as inferred from φ (∞,0) q and equation (S13). Therefore φ decays (approximately) exponentially with b, as shown by figure 3(a) .
IV. CORRELATIONS & COOPERATION IN THE ECO-EVOLUTIONARY GAME
After a time t ≫ 1/s, fixation has very likely occurred and the population composition is fixed and consists of only F or S individuals. In this quasi-stationary regime, the population size N (t) however keeps fluctuating, driven by the randomly switching carrying capacity K(t).
When the slow strain S produces a public good (PG), the long-time eco-evolutionary dynamics is characterized by correlations between the population size and its composition. In this section, we analyze these long-term effects by characterizing the correlations first, and then by analyzing the ensuing "eco-evolutionary game".
To this end, it is useful to consider the average population size N * ν,b for given ν and b, after a time t ≫ 1/s, when the population is at quasi-stationarity and consists of only S or F individuals, see Section SM-V.B [40] . Within the PDMP approximation-that is, approximating the evolution of N by the PDMP (9), see Section SM-VI.A [40] -we can compute the quasi-stationary average of N using p * ν,q given by eq. (S3) (see also Sec. V A):
where N * ν,0 is the population long-time average in the absence of PG production, φ b denotes the fixation probability of S for a public good parameter b, and φ b = 1 − φ b . Through equation (16) , the PDMP approximation thus predicts that the long-term population size increases with b, see figure 3(b). Furthermore, while the fixation probabilities φ b and φ b can increase or decrease with ν, the PDMP approximation predicts that the average population size at stationarity monotonically decreases with ν (see (S20)-(S22) in SM-VI.A [40] ). Simulation results shown in figure 3(b) confirm that N * ν,b increases with b, and decreases with ν (keeping other parameters constant). 
A. Correlations between ecological & evolutionary dynamics
Equation (16) also highlights how fixation probabilities affect the long-term average population size. When b > 0, there are nontrivial correlations between population size and composition, and how N (t) and x(t) are correlated is of direct biological relevance, see e.g. [30, 31] . Prior to fixation, these correlations are accounted by the effective parameter q(b) (see section III C 2). Here, we investigate their effect after fixation using the rescaled connected correlation function
where · denotes the ensemble average. When
Within the PDMP approximation, using eq. (16) and φ b ≃ φ q , equation (17) Since N * ν,0 is decreasing in ν (see figure 3(a)), this longterm correlation is always positive for b ≥ 0, and vanishes only for b = 0.
As shown in figure 4, C * ν,b grows approximately linearly with b and is non-monotonic in ν with a maximum for ν = O(1); all features that equation (18) captures well. The ν-dependence of C * ν,b stems from the fact that φ b increases or decreases with ν, depending on the value of s, see figure 2(c) [39] . In the limiting regimes ν → ∞, 0, equation (18) simplifies and yields C *
. Therefore, in these the limiting regimes C * ν,b increases in s, and scales as O(b), as shown by figure 4, yielding N x
These results show that, when species S provides a PG, there are nontrivial long-term correlations between ecological and evolutionary variables: the population size is shaped by its composition. The correlations between N and x are maximal in the intermediate switching regime where ν = O(1) is comparable to the growth rate of N , and are weaker in the limiting switching regimes, on which we devised the effective theory of section III C 2.
B. When is cooperation beneficial? In which conditions is it best to cooperate?
Producing the public good (PG) slows the growth of the S strain, see equation (7) with g(x) > 0, and thus reduces exponentially the fixation probability of S, as shown in figure 3(a). On the other hand, the PG leads to higher average population sizes (see equation (16) and figure 3(b)) and therefore provides a long-term benefit to the whole population. At the population level, a "social dilemma" [24, 41] of sorts arises after fixation of either F or S: Cooperators pay a cost through their reduced fixation probability, while they provide a benefit, through the PG, by increasing the expected long-term number of individuals of both strains. We analyze the trade-off between benefit and cost of cooperation by introducing the notion of "eco-evolutionary game" in the context of a metapopulation of non-interacting communities: Each system realization (simulation run) corresponds to a community of time-fluctuating size, and the collection of the system's realizations constitutes the metapopulation [26, 27, 30, 37] , that is an ensemble of non-interacting communities. After fixation, each community consists of only S or F individuals. It is worth emphasizing that the social dilemma arising in the ecoevolutionary game differs from traditional games in a finite population of constant size [24, 41] : Although F is always more likely to fixate than S (when x 0 is not too close to 1, as in classical evolutionary games), communities consisting only of individuals of strain S can be of significantly larger size than those containing only F 's thanks to their production of PG (allowing them to possibly attain the maximum carrying capacity (1 + b)K + ). In this eco-evolutionary game in a population of time-varying size, we thus propose to measure the evolutionary success of a strain in terms of the population size averaged after fixation over the ensemble of non-interacting communities, see also Section SM-VI.B of the SM [40] : The expected payoff of the game is hence the relative long-term average number of individuals of each strain, see below. Interestingly, this formulation of the eco-evolutionary game is of potential direct relevance to microbial experiments in which colonies of bacteria, some of which can produce a public good, are grown and compete in "a metapopulation of test tubes", see e.g. [30, 31, 36, 37] .
Below, we use the PDMP approximation and simulations to investigate the relative abundance of each species at quasistationarity (see also Section SM-VI.A [40] ).
The average number of F individuals at quasi-stationarity, given a switching rate ν and PG parameter b is
i.e. the average population size conditioned to F fixation. Similarly, the average number of cooperators S at quasistationarity is
In the context of the above eco-evolutionary game, we propose to measure the expected payoff provided by the PG as the difference between the expected number of individuals of a strain at quasi-stationarity when b > 0 relative to the case b = 0. Hence, the expected payoff to F is
Since φ 0 > φ b , see figure 3(b), this quantity is positive and increases with b. This means that, as in other social dilemmas, see, e.g., Ref. [24, 41] , the benefit of "freeriding" increases when the level of cooperation, here given by b, is raised. However, this does not rule out the possibility that, under certain circumstances, the PG production can be either beneficial or detrimental to S, and even permits S to be better off than F . In fact, the (global) eco-evolutionary expected payoff for cooperators reads
and clearly varies nontrivially with ν and b. Unless ∆S ν,b > 0, the PG is actually detrimental for cooperators: the expected number of S individuals is lower than it would be without PG.
In this context, the PG benefits cooperators only if the increase in the average population size offsets the decrease in fixation probability, i.e. if
In figure 5 , we show that ∆S ν,b is non-monotonic in b, generating a maximum at an optimal value b * (ν, s), which defines the conditions where PG production is the most rewarding for cooperators. Moreover, we observe a definite critical threshold b c (ν, s), below which producing a PG benefits cooperators since ∆S ν,b > 0.
Using our effective theory, φ ≃ φ q(b) , and the PDMP approximation, the expected payoff of S (S24) reads
When ν → ∞, the DMN self-averages (ξ → ξ = 0) and equation (S24) is given by the expected payoff of S in a population of effective size N *
]K. Hence, when the DMN self-averages, the expected payoff of S is positive if φ
Results in figure 5 show that equation (21) approximates well the simulation results over a broad range of parameters. The root and the maximum of equation (21) provide (approximate) predictions for b c and b
* , see figures 6 and S7(a) [40] . These figures reveal that b c and b * depend non-monotonically on ν and vary greatly with s, both behaviors well-captured by the theory. Figures 5 and S7(b) [40] also show that the maximal payoff for S can be significantly higher than that of F , especially when the selection s is low. In order to discuss the properties of the eco-evolutionary game, it is useful to determine the value b = β(ν, s) of equal expected payoff, i.e. such that which ∆S ν,β = ∆F ν,β , see figure 5(c). From equations (S25)- (21), we find that β(ν, s) is the solution of
So β is a nontrivial function of ν and s, see figure 6 (b). Given the parameters b and s of the eco-evolutionary game, we have studied the values of the switching rate ν for which 0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 * (ν, s). In the blue area (phases (i) and (ii)), b > β and F is better off than S (∆F ν,b > ∆S ν,b ). PG production is detrimental for S in phase (i) where b > bc and ∆S ν,b < 0; beneficial for S (∆S ν,b > 0) in phase (ii) where β < b < bc, but more beneficial for F (higher expected payoff). In the red/pink area of region (iii), b < β and S is better off than F (∆S ν,b > ∆F ν,b ), see text. Colored dots correspond to "gaps" in the numerical data (see [40] ). Parameters are (K+, K−, x0) = (450, 50, 0.5).
it is beneficial to cooperate by producing a public good, and determined three distinct phases represented in the diagram of figure 6(b):
(i) When b > b c , the PG production is detrimental for S.
The cost of cooperation outweighs its benefits and the expected payoff for S is negative (∆S ν,b < 0). The PG thus benefits only F .
(ii) When β < b < b c , the PG production benefits S, but benefits F more (0 < ∆S ν,b < ∆F ν,b ).
(iii) When 0 < b < β, S reaps a higher expected payoff than
. In this case, the benefit of the PG outweigh its cost, and its production is favored.
Within the above metapopulation interpretation of the ecoevolutionary game, species F effectively exploits S in phases (i) and (ii), but is at a disadvantage in phase (iii). Since the expected payoff to S is positive in regions (ii) and (iii), we say that cooperation of a public good with benefit parameter b is beneficial when 0 < b < b c (ν, s), and advantageous for 0 < b < β(ν, s). Given a set of parameters (b, ν, s), PG production is the best strategy if two conditions are met: (a) the expected payoff of S is higher than that of F , which is satisfied in phase (iii); (b) b yields the maximum possible payoff for S, i.e., b = b * . Hence, in an environment switching at rate ν and under a selection intensity s, the best conditions to cooperate for the public good production is when the PG benefit parameter satisfies b = b * (ν, s) < β(ν, s), represented by the solid gray line in phase (iii) of figure 6(b). It is also worth noting that this discussion also holds when the time-varying population size is not driven by the environmental noise: The limiting case ν → ∞, for which the DMN self-averages and the population reaches an effective size N → K, corresponds to the right end of the diagram of figure 6(b) where ν ≫ 1. Remarkably, environmental stochasticity yields several additional regimes in which cooperating becomes beneficial.
In the above context of a well-mixed population whose size fluctuates in time, this eco-evolutionary game shows that there are conditions under which PG production is beneficial for cooperators, and may even be the optimal strategy. This does not imply that the social dilemma, which still holds in its classical form prior to fixation, is resolved in general. However, this demonstrates that under environmental variability there are conditions in which cooperation (PG production), albeit disadvantaged in the short term, can be more successful than freeriding in the long term. In fact, although freeriders have a constant growth-rate advantage over cooperators and are always more likely to fixate (assuming x 0 = 1/2), here, the selective bias can be efficiently balanced by environmental variability, by allowing cooperators to be successful in forming, in the long term, larger communities than freeriders [40] . This can result in a greater increase of the long-term average number of cooperators than free-riders, and exemplifies the potential role of a fluctuating environment on the emergence of cooperative behavior in microbial communities.
V. LINEAR-NOISE AND PDMP APPROXIMATIONS TO THE POPULATION QSD
After t ≫ 1/s, the population is likely to be at quasistationarity with its composition fixed [39] . Yet, the population size still fluctuates and N (t) is distributed according to its quasi-stationary distribution. When K − ≫ 1, the population size is always large and, in the first instance, demographic fluctuations are negligible compared to environmental noise. In this case, eq. (9) characterizes reasonably well, albeit not fully, the long-term properties of N (t). The LNA is widely employed to quantify the effect of weak demographic fluctuations in the absence of external noise [68, 69] , and has recently been used to study the joint effect of decoupled internal and external noise [12] . Here, we show how to generalize the LNA to the case where the population size fluctuates and demographic fluctuations are coupled to the external noise.
For our analysis, we assume that K + K − ≫ 1, so that K is large and of the same order as K ± (see Section SM-VII [40] for details). It is convenient to work with the continuous random variable n = N/Ω, where Ω = K ≫ 1 is the system's "large parameter". The auxiliary Markovian process {n(t), ξ(t)} that we consider for the LNA is defined by n
, where the transition rates T ± are given by equations (S30) in the SM [40] . We also introduce ψ = lim Ω→∞ N/Ω = O(1), which obeys the stochastic differential equation (S33) [40] defining the corresponding PDMP, and the random variable η(t), capturing the fluctuations of n about ψ, according to
We are interested in the (quasi-)stationary joint probability density π * ν,q (η, ψ, ξ) of the process {n(t), ξ(t)}. This probability density can be decomposed into π *
is the stationary joint PDF of the PDMP {ψ(t)} and is readily obtained from the PDF of the PDMP defined by equation (9) . The stationary probability density π * (η|ψ, ξ) accounts for the demographic fluctuations about {ψ(t)} in the environmental state ξ. Following Ref. [12] , we assume that the demographic fluctuations are approximately the same in both environmental states, i.e. π * ν,q (η|ψ, ξ) ≃ π * ν,q (η|ψ, −ξ), and simply denote π * ν,q (η|ψ) ≡ π * ν,q (η|ψ, ±ξ). This assumption is reasonable when K + and K − are of the same order, and yields
With this approximation, the quasi-stationary marginal LNA probability density of {n(t)} is 
where, it is worth noting, the integral is no longer restricted to a finite support. As figure 3(b) shows, N * LNA,ν,b is as good an approximation of simulation results, as its PDMP counterpart N * ν,b from equation (16) . This is not surprising, and as done in Section IV, it is convenient to compute the averages of N using the PDMP approximation, i.e. by averaging over p * PDMP,ν,b (N ) as in eq. (16) . However, as elaborated below, the LNA via the equation (26) gives an excellent characterization of the full N -QSD, well beyond the scope of the PDMP approximation. rate is lower than the population growth rate, and the N -QSD and p * LNA,0 are both bimodal, with peaks at N ≈ K ± , see figure 7 (a,b) . When ν > 1, the switching rate exceeds the population growth rate, and the N -QSD and p * LNA,ν,0 are thus unimodal, with a peak at N ≈ K, see Figure 7(c,d) . As figure 8 shows, p * LNA,ν,b (N ) provides a faithful characterization of the N -QSD also when b > 0. This reiterates that the discrepancies with the PDMP approximation stem from demographic fluctuations. We also notice that the accuracy of the LNA slightly deteriorates near the lower-intensity peaks at high N and low ν (see figure 8(a) ). These correspond to rare events, usually beyond the scope of the LNA. Moreover, in those regimes, some assumptions made in the derivatione.g. equation (24)-reach the limit of their validity, see SM [40] .
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied the eco-evolutionary dynamics of a population subject to a randomly switching carrying capacity in which one strain has a slight selective advantage over another. In a model inspired by microbial communities evolving in fluctuating environments, we have considered two scenarios-one of pure resource competition (no interaction between strains) and one in which the slow (cooperating) strain produces a public good-and investigated the coupled effect of demographic and environmental noise.
The population composition has been characterized by the fixation probabilities, computed using the analytical procedure devised in Ref. [39] , and, when a public good is produced, shown to be non-trivially correlated with the evolution of the population size. As a result, the production of public good gives rise to an eco-evolutionary game: On the one hand, producing the public good lowers the survival/fixation probability of cooperators; on the other hand, it also increases their population size. A social dilemma of sorts therefore ensues and, in a fluctuating environment, it is a priori not intuitively clear whether there are circumstances under which it is beneficial to produce a public good and what these conditions may be. Since we consider the eco-evolutionary game in a population of fixed composition (after fixation) but whose size fluctuates, we have proposed to measure the evolutionary benefit of the public good in terms of the long-term expected number of individuals of each strain. This is done in the biologicallyinspired setting of a metapopulation of non-interacting communities of varying size composed uniquely by one of the species. In certain circumstances, that we have determined, the public good production allows the communities composed of cooperating S individuals to achieve a greater long-term increase of their average size than the communities consisting of freeriding F individuals. In these conditions, we say that the cooperating strain outcompetes the freeriding one. We have thus determined, both analytically and with simulations, the circumstances under which cooperation is beneficial or detrimental to public good producers, as well as the conditions under which it is the optimal strategy. Hence, we have demonstrated that the rate of switching, along with the selection intensity and the public good parameter, determine when one species is more successful than another. Our analysis of the "eco-evolutionary game" thus shows that in a fluctuating population the evolutionary success of a strain goes beyond having a growth-rate advantage and a higher fixation probability.
We have also advanced the characterization of the population size distribution by generalizing the linear noise approximation to populations of fluctuating size, thus accounting for demographic fluctuations about the predictions of the underlying piecewise deterministic Markov process. While we have found that the linear noise and the piecewise-deterministic Markov process approximations describe the average population size equally well, only the former fully characterizes the population size distribution. In fact, the linear noise approach accounts for the joint effect of environmental and demographic noise and has allowed us to capture the width and skewness of the population size distribution.
This study shows that coupled environmental and demographic noise can greatly influence how the composition and size of a population evolve. In particular, social interactions between strains-such as public good production-can lead to intricate eco-evolutionary dynamics, which potentially support cooperation. This sheds light on phenomena that are directly relevant to microbial communities, which often feature coupled internal and ecological evolution. This can yield the kind of eco-evolutionary game analyzed here, that can be a potential theoretical framework for experimental studies investigating the emergence of cooperative behavior in microbial communities of time-fluctuating size.
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Appendix: Supplementary Material for

Eco-Evolutionary Dynamics of a Population with Randomly Switching Carrying Capacity
In this Supplementary Material, we provide comments concerning the dichotomous noise, notes on the methodology and data avalability, the derivation of the probability densities of the piecewise-deterministic Markov process (PDMP), complementary results about the mean fixation times, as well as additional discussions about the PDMP approximation and the emergence of cooperation in the eco-evolutionary game, and additional technical details concerning the linear noise approximation to the population size's quasi-stationary distribution.
In what follows, unless stated otherwise, the notation is the same as in the main text and the equations and figures refer to those therein. (As in the main text, unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, below we tacitly assume x 0 = 1/2.)
SM-I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DICHOTOMOUS MARKOV NOISE AND OTHER FORMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL NOISE
It is worth outlining some of the similarities and differences between the dichotomous Markov Noise (DMN) and the OrnsteinUhlenbeck process (OUP) that is also commonly used to model environmental noise, see e.g. [9] . Both are colored noises with exponential auto-correlation functions, see Sec. II in the main text and Refs. [43, 44] . However, while the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Process is a Gaussian and unbounded process, the DMN is, in general, neither. In fact, the piecewise-deterministic Markov process (PDMP) [58] 
with the DMN ξ, becomes a diffusive process with Gaussian white noise and diffusion constant D = ∆ 2 /ν only in the limit of ∆ → ∞, ν → ∞ and 0 < D < ∞, see, e.g., Refs. [43, 44, 47] . The PDMP that we consider in this work has the form:
which coincides with equations (9) of the main text and (S1) with ∆ = (K + − K − )/(2K + K − ). Since K + > K − ≫ 1, the Gaussian white noise limit is unphysical, and the PDMP that we consider in this work is therefore never diffusive. It is also worth noting that, being bounded, the DMN has the great advantage of guaranteeing that the fluctuating carrying capacity K(t) = [(K + + K − ) + ξ(t)(K + − K − )]/2 remains always finite and positive, which would not be the case if ξ(t) was given by an OUP. Furthermore, the DMN can be considered a discrete-step approximation [43, 44] of the OUP, but is more mathematically tractable and easier to simulate.
SM-II. NOTES ON METHODOLOGY & DATA AVAILABILITY
Source code for all simulations, resulting data and the Mathematica notebook [63] used for calculations and figures are available electronically [40] .
A. Stochastic simulations Using Gillespie's stochastic simulation algorithm (SSA) [64] , we have simulated exactly the dynamics described by the master equation (5) . To efficiently ensure that quasi-stationarity was reached [52] , we have run individual-based simulations until fixation occurred in 99% of the realizations (for ν s), or until time reaches t = 10/ν (when ν ≪ s). We have simulated ensembles of 10 4 realizations of the system, except to determine the various population size distributions (for which we used a larger sample of 10 5 realizations) and when using "high values" of s (i.e. for s = O(1) as in figure S2 ). In this case, an even larger sample of 10 6 realizations was needed to accurately estimate the fixation probability of S.
B. Numerical limitations on effective parameter q(b) approach
To obtain the parameter q(b) used in the formula (15) for φ q , we first recorded the fixation probability from SSA results with constant K = K, b ∈ {0.1k : k ∈ N, k ≤ 100}, and s ∈ {0.02, 0.05} (10 6 runs each). For each combination of parameters, we computed q(b) by matching the fixation probability φ| (1+q)K of the fitness-dependent Moran model, see equation (S13), with the corresponding fixation probability obtained in the SSA result.
The values of q(b) have then been used to compute φ q according to equation (15) for several values of ν, as shown in figure  3(b) . Due to numerical instabilities in the evaluation of stationary distribution p * ν,q in Mathematica [63] , numerical evaluations of φ q occasionally "failed" or produced outliers. Data corresponding to these occasional issues were omitted (without statistical consequences) from our dataset. This has sometimes led to some gaps in the lines of the analytical predictions (see e.g. the green curve in figure 3 (b) ). Furthermore, q(b) has only been determined for a discrete set of b values, which limits the resolution in determining b c and b * . Specifically, since the spacing between the values used for b was 0.1, neither b * nor b c has been determined with an accuracy higher than 0.1. The combination of limited resolution and outliers causes the jaggedness observed in figure S7(a) for the graph of b * obtained by looking for the maximum of equation (21).
C. Data availability: Mathematica notebook & Linear noise approximation figures 7 and 8
The direct numerical evaluation of equations (S39) and (S40), used to generate the figures 7 and 8, is commented in the accompanying Mathematica notebook [40] . 
SM-III. JOINT AND MARGINAL STATIONARY PDFS OF THE AUXILIARY PDMP (9)
In the main text, we have frequently used of the marginal stationary probability density function (PDF) of the single-variate PDMP (9) that reads
and is given by equation (12) in the main text. When b = q = 0, we have p *
In this section, we outline the derivation of this PDF, as well as that of the joint stationary probability density p * ν,q (N, ξ) of N and ξ. For notational simplicity, in the remainder of this section, we write p ν,q = p and p * ν,q = p * . It follows from the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation, that p(N, ξ) obeys the master-like equation [43] 
which can conveniently be rewritten as ∂ t p(N, ξ, t) = −∂ N J(N, ξ, t) in terms of the probability current [12] 
The first term on the right-hand-side (RHS) of (S5) accounts for the probability flowing outside [N * − , N ] (Liouvillian flow), whereas the second accounts for the random switching. At stationarity, lim t→∞ p(N, ξ, t) = p * (N, ξ) and
With the (natural) zerocurrent boundary conditions at N * ± [43] , i.e. J * (N, ξ) = 0, we find a simple relationship between the PDFs in each of the environmental states:
With this relation,
Combined with equation (S6), this readily yields
and F ± are defined by eq. (10). The joint stationary PDF giving the probability density of N in each environmental state is thus explicitly given by
where Z is the normalization constant. In figure S1 , we compare the predictions of the joint PDF p * (N, ξ) with the histograms of the population size obtained from SSA results, verifying that the PDMP description aptly reproduces the location and number of peaks that characterize the quasi-stationary distribution of N (see also [39, 53] ).
The marginal stationary PDF p
, which yields the explicit expression (S3).
It is also useful to notice that, at stationarity, the probability that the PDMP (9) is in the environmental state ξ, given a population size N is given by [12] 
SM-IV. ASSESSMENT OF ACCURACY OF FORMULAS FOR THE FIXATION PROBABILITY
A central point of our analysis is the formula to compute the fixation probability of S (see section III.C.1 in the main text), φ, with the formula [39] 
When s = O(1), the assumption of a timescale separation between N and x that underpins the derivation of equation (S10) is no longer valid. As a consequence, the relative deviations between the predictions of eq. (14) and the SSA results for φ increase with s, as shown in figure S2 . To quantify the accuracy of equation (S10), we have compared its predictions with the simulation results of 10 6 realizations obtained for different values of ν and s spanning between 0 and 0.25, recording the SSA fixation probability φ sim . For each combination of parameters (different colors in Figure S2 ), we determined the theoretical prediction φ th from eq. (S10) and the percentage deviation between it and the simulation result ∆φ = 100|φ th − φ sim |/φ sim . As figure S2 shows, theoretical results reproduce simulations for small s, with relative deviations below 10%. Discrepancies increase more and more as the selection intensity is increased towards s = O(1) (when s > 0.1, in figure S2 ). The approximation underpinning (S10) is therefore valid in the regime s ≪ 1, which is the regime of weak selection pressure on which we focus (see main text), and deteriorates as s approaches s = O(1). Within the regime s ≪ 1, we have similarly assessed the accuracy of equation (14) for different switching rates ν. We simulated For the case with public good production, we have used an effective approach and obtained the following expression (15) for the fixation probability of S (see section III.C.2) which, with eq. (S13), reads [39] :
This expression also builds on a timescale separation between an effective population size and x. Besides the breakdown of the timescale separation when s = O(1), the accuracy of the approximation φ ≃ φ q deteriorates for higher values of b and/or s, because the fixation of S then becomes increasingly unlikely, see figure 3(a) , which limits the accuracy with which q(b) is determined and hence the predictions of equation (15) . Figure S3(b) shows the results for the percentage deviation of the predictions of equation (S11), using the appropriate values of the effective parameter q(b) (excluding a few outliers), and φ sim obtained from 10 4 SSA realizations. For s = 0.02, b = 0.2 (blue), ∆φ is between 0 and 8%, with average 3% and a standard deviation of 2%. For s = 0.05, b = 2 (red), we observe larger and more scattered ∆φ between 0 and 28%, with average 12% and standard deviation 7%. While a deterioration of the approximation when s and b are increased can explain the increase in the average ∆φ, higher values of s and b also cause lower fixation probabilities for S, see figure 3(a) . The corresponding values of φ are small which results in noisier values of φ sim and ∆φ, as shown by red data in figure S3 . Overall, the above analyis confirms that our approach is able to predict the fixation probability φ in the regime of weak selection intensity (0 < s ≪ 1), both when b = 0 and 0 < b = O(1), with a remarkable accuracy of a few percent over a vast range of values ν.
SM-V. FIXATION IN THE FITNESS-DEPENDENT MORAN PROCESS & MEAN FIXATION TIME UNDER SWITCHING CARRYING CAPACITY
A. Fixation in the fitness-dependent Moran process
To study the fixation properties of the system, we have used the properties of the fitness-dependent Moran Process (fdMP) outlined in section III.B of the main text [22, 23, 60, 65] . In a population of large but finite and constant size N , the fixation properties under weak selection of the fdMP can be inferred from the backward Fokker-Planck equation associated with the generator [22, 23, 41, 65, 68, 69] 
For an initial fraction x 0 of S individuals, the fixation probability
and φ(0)| N = 0 (absorbing boundaries at x = 0, 1). Yielding the result
given as equation (S13) in the main text. The generator (S12) can also be used to study when fixation occurs in the fdMP in the realm of the diffusion approximation [22, 23, 41, 65] . Quantities of particular interest, are the unconditional mean fixation time (MFT)-which is the average time to reach any of the absorbing states, here either x = 0 or x = 1-as well as the conditional MFTs-the mean time to reach a specific absorbing boundary. The unconditional MFT is obtained by solving [22, 41, 68] . The conditional MFT to reach x = 1 is denoted by T S (x 0 )| N , while T F (x 0 )| N is the (conditional) MFT conditioned to reach x = 0. The MFTs and the fixation probabilities are related by
Explicit, but unwieldy, expressions for the MFTs in the fdMP can be obtained [22, 41, 65, 68] , e.g. the unconditional MFT in the case b = 0 reads
where γ ≈ 0.577... is the Euler-Mascheroni constant, and Ei(z) =
z is the exponential integral. Hence, in the regime where s ≪ 1, with N s ≫ 1, and s(ln N ) ≪ 1 (with x 0 is sufficiently separated from x = 0, 1), T (x 0 )| N ∼ (ln N )/s [22, 23, 65] , with a subleading prefactor ∼ ln N . The conditional MFTs exhibit the same behavior T S/F (x 0 ) ∼ T (x 0 ) = O(1/s) to leading order when s ≪ 1, see figure S4 . A similar behavior also holds when b > 0 and s ≪ 1, with a subleading prefactor that then depends (weakly) on the public good parameter b = O(1), specifically T (x 0 )| N ∼ (ln (N − O(b)))/s, as confirmed by figure S4 . The public good parameter b, in fact, reduces the relaxation time of x, see equation (7), which results in a weak reduction of the unconditional and MFTs with respect to the case with b = 0, see also figure S4(b,c) . The most relevant point for our purposes, is the fact that the unconditional MFT of the fdMP scales as O(1/s) to leading order when s ≪ 1 and N s ≫ 1, and so do the conditional MFTs, in both cases b = 0 and b > 0.
Results (S12)-(S14) can be used to obtain the fixation properties of fdMP in a population of finite size subject to a constant carrying capacity K. This is done by setting N = K in (S12)-(S14), which neglects the rare/unlikely early fixation events occurring during the exponential growth phase (assuming x 0 = 1/2). 
B. Mean fixation times with a switching carrying capacity
In a population subject to a randomly switching carrying capacity, with no public good production, the size and growth rate are independent of the composition. As explained in Ref. [39, 53] , when b = 0, the conditional and unconditional MFTs admit the same scaling to leading order when s ≪ 1, i.e. T S/F (x 0 ) ∼ T (x 0 ) = O(1/s), and we can use the approach outlined in Section III.C.1, to compute [53] T
Figure S5 In the case b > 0, the evolution of the population size and its composition are coupled. As discussed in the main text, S is less likely to fixate when b is increased, and the population size at fixation depends on which species takes over (the population size is typically larger when S fixates). On the other hand, according to eq. (7), increasing b reduces the relaxation time of x. Since these two effects balance each other, we expect the effect of b > 0 to be even weaker in the switching environment than in the fdMP with constant population size. Having seen that b has a weak effect on the MFTs, we anticipate that the MFTs with a switching carrying capacity exhibit a similar behavior as those of the fdMP. To verify this picture and figure out on which timescale fixation occurs when b > 0, we have considered the fixation of S and F separately by studying their conditional MFTs [53] . For this, we can attempt to generalize the approach used in the case b = 0 and consider the averages over the av. # switches before fix. 
where T S/F (x 0 )| N are the conditional MFTs of the fdMP with b > 0. A clear limitation of formula (S16) and (S17) stems from the fact that p * ν/s,b (N ) and p * ν/s (N ) provide a good approximation of the N -QSD in the quasi-stationary state that is reached after t ≫ 1/s, see Ref. [62] , i.e. well after fixation has typically occurred. However, since the population size and the parameter b only yield subleading contributions to the MFTs of the fdMP when s ≪ 1, we expect that formula (S16)-(S18) are still able to capture how the MFTs scale to leading order under weak selection intensity. The comparison of SSA results for the MFTs with b > 0 reported in figure S5 , and their comparison with those of figure (S4) confirm this picture. Since the b-dependence of the MFTs in figure (S4) is clearly subleading, we can simplify the evaluation of (S16) by setting g ≡ 1 + b (and similarly g ≡ 1 in (S17)). As shown in figure (S5)(b), this does not affect the leading behavior of T S . Figures S5(b,c) show that the simplified formula (S16) and (S17) indeed correctly predict that the conditional MFTs scale as O(1/s) when s ≪ 1, even if, as expected, they overstimate the SSA results for T S and T F . Hence, equation (S18) predicts that to leading order the uncoditional MFT scales as O(1/s), which is in good agreement with the SSA results reported in figure  S5(a) . As s and b increase, the fixation of S becomes less likely and thus T (x 0 ) ≃ T F (x 0 ), as shown by figures S5(a) and (c). We notice that SSA results reported in figure S5 confirm that the MFTs with randomly switching carrying capacity depend even more weakly on the public good parameter b than in the fdMP where N is constant.
We therefore conclude that, under weak selection 1/ K ≪ s ≪ 1, and with b = O(1), the MFTs in the case b > 0 scale as O(1/s). This means that the fixation in the public good scenario (b > 0) is likely to have occurred when t 1/s, as in the case b = 0. This also implies that, when b ≥ 0, the population size is most probably at quasi-stationarity when t ≫ 1/s, and its composition consists then of only F or S individuals. These results thus indicate that, to leading order in 1/s (with K s ≪ 1), the MFTs here scale as in the absence of external noise. Hence, while environmental noise has a significant effect on the fixation probability (see Section III.C in the main text), its effect on the MFTs is much less important, as captured by the formula (S16)-(S18). A consequence of these results is that the population experiences, on average, O(ν/s) switches prior to fixation when b ≥ 0 and 1/ K ≪ s ≪ 1. In fact, the figure S6 confirms that the average number of switches prior to fixation scales as 1/s to leading order when 1/ K ≪ s ≪ 1 in the case b = 0. In figure S6(b) , we show that the average number of switches prior to fixation increases linearly with ν, with simulation data for different values of ν essentially collapsing when rescaled by a factor 1/ν. Since the population size greatly varies when ν changes, see, e.g. the videos in [62] , the fact that the average number of switches increases simply linearly with ν is a strong indication of its weak dependence on the population size, and is a further argument supporting the rescaling ν → ν/s in formula (14) and (15) .
SM-VI. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ON THE PDMP APPROXIMATION AND THE "ECO-EVOLUTIONARY GAME"
A. PDMP approximation and average number of individuals
The analysis of the correlations between population size and its composition (Section IV.A), and that of the "eco-evolutionary game" (Section IV.B), relies largely on properties of the average population size at quasi-stationarity given by
where φ b is the fixation probability of species S under a public good parameter b, within what in the main text is referred to as the "PDMP approximation". This approximation consists of averaging the population size N over the marginal PDF (S3) of the PDMP (9). To derive equation (S19), which coincides with equation (16) 
where N * ν,0 is the quasi-stationary average population size when b = 0 and the integration is over p * ν ≡ p * ν,0 given by eq. (S3). Similarly, the fixation of S occurs with probability φ b , after which g = 1 + b, yielding
The last equality is obtained by performing the change of variable N → N/(1 + b) and allows us to express N * ν,b in terms of the average when b = 0. Putting everything together, we obtain eq. (16) :
where in the last line we have used the approximation φ b ≃ φ q(b) given by equation (15) . In Section IV, we have often considered the limiting regimes of very fast/slow switching, ν → ∞, 0, in which the analytical formula greatly simplify. To obtain these simplified expressions, it suffices to notice that (16) and using φ ≃ φ q(b) we obtain the average population size in the limiting regimes:
The limiting behavior reported as dashed lines in figures 3(b) and 4(b) can readily be obtained from equations (S23).
B. Best conditions for cooperation in the eco-evolutionary game
A finite well-mixed population of constant size is the natural setting of evolutionary game theory (EGT). The notion of evolutionary stability is central to EGT since an evolutionary stable strategy, when adopted by a population, cannot be invaded and replaced by an alternative strategy. For a population with two possible strategies, one is evolutionary stable if it satisfies the so-called invasion and replacement conditions [24, 67] . As a result, the sole fact that one strategy has a higher fitness than another does not guarantee that it is evolutionary stable since an individual of the other type may have a better chance to fixate the population.
For the model considered here, in a finite and static population, the strain F has always a higher fitness than S, and the fixation probability of S vanishes exponentially with the population size, see equation (S13). In a finite and static population, F is therefore evolutionary stable, and in this sense always superior to S.
The situation is radically different in the eco-evolutionary game considered here since the population continues to evolve in a fluctuating environment even after fixation, and the notions of non-invadibility / non-replacement are no longer suitable to measure the species evolutionary success:
As discussed in Section IV.B of the main text, even if S has always a lower fitness and a lesser chance to fixate than F , its occasional fixation can prove very rewarding since it allows cooperators to establish a large community of S individuals (of a size that can be significantly larger than the size of an average community of F individuals). In the context of the interpretation of the eco-evolutionary game in terms of a biologically motivated metapopulation of non-interacting communities, see Section IV.B of the main text, we have proposed to measure the success of S and F in this eco-evolutionary game by computing the difference between the expected long-term number of individuals ∆S ν,b and ∆F ν,b , compared to the b = 0 case. ∆S ν,b and ∆F ν,b thus serve as expected payoffs in our eco-evolutionary game. In the PDMP approximation, we can use our effective approach (see section III.C.2) and equations (S20) and (S21), to obtain K when ν → 0.
As shown in figure 5 , ∆S ν,b is non-monotonic in b and has a maximum for b = b * . This is then the optimal value of b for the cooperating strain S (given s, ν, K ± ). Figure S7 Figure S7(b) shows ∆S ν,b * / N * ν,0 : the optimal payoff for cooperators divided by the long-time average population at b = 0. In other words, it shows how much bigger is, on average, the best-performing cooperating population, compared to the average population at b = 0. For sufficiently low s, e.g. for s = 0.02 (blue), the public good can make the average number of S individuals be up to 12% − 25% larger than the average population at b = 0 (∆S ν,b * / N * ν,0 ≈ 0.12 − 0.25 across all values of ν). Figure S7 (b) corresponds to results at quasi-stationarity, i.e. after fixation has occurred (with a smaller probability for S than F ) and therefore shows the actual long-term eco-evolutionary payoff for cooperation: In the optimal conditions, the S strain can gain a significant benefit from the production of a public good.
As discussed in Section IV.B of the main text, there are conditions under which S receives a higher expected payoff than F in the sense that ∆S ν,b > ∆F ν,b . When this happens, cooperating is not only beneficial but is also advantageous for S. We have considered that for given parameters (ν, s), it is best to cooperate for the production of a public good with benefit parameter b when the following two conditions are satisfied: (a) ∆S ν,b > ∆F ν,b ; (b) b = b * (ν, s) < β(ν, s). These conditions ensure (a) that S receives a higher payoff than F , and (b) that S receives the maximum payoff under the switching rate ν and selection strength s. On the other hand, species F always outperforms S when b > β(ν, s) since it then receives a higher expected payoff than S, with ∆F ν,b that is an increasing function of b for all values of ν and s, see figure 5(c).
As shown in figure 6 It is noteworthy that in the limiting switching regimes ν ≫ 1 and ν ≪ s, this equation greatly simplifies. In fact, using (S23), equation (S27) q(β) /2 in both limiting regimes. It is however important to remember that in general φ β ≃ φ q(β) depends nontrivially on ν and s, and can be either an increasing or decreasing function of ν, see figures 2(a) and 3(a).
While the choice made here on how to measure the success of S and F is arguably the most natural, we could have also considered other variants. For instance, we could have considered that the best conditions to cooperate for the production of the public good would be: S should receive a higher payoff than F , condition (a) as above, and, S should maximize the difference of payoffs ∆S ν,b − ∆F ν,b (instead of condition (b)). This would lead to an optimal value of the public good benefit b that would generally differ from b * especially at low switching rate (see figure 5(c) ). While this alternative definition of the optimal payoff for S would lead to quantitative differences with the results reported in figure 6(b) , the main qualitative features discussed here and in section IV.B would remain the same.
SM-VII. EFFECT OF INTERNAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL NOISE ON POPULATION SIZE DISTRIBUTION -LINEAR NOISE APPROXIMATION ABOUT THE PDMP PREDICTIONS
The PDMP approximation of the N -QSD can reproduce the number and location of its peaks, but fails to capture the width of the distribution about the peaks and its accurate skewness, see, e.g., figure S1 . In this section, we derive the linear noise approximation (LNA) of the N -QSD used in Section V to account for the demographic fluctuations about the PDMP predictions [12] .
After the fixation of species S, N S = N and N F = 0, and the transition rates of the underpinning birth-death process become T with symmetric dichotomous Markov noise ξ(t) ∈ {−1, +1} and randomly switching carrying capacity defined by equations (3) and (4). This stochastic process is defined by the transition rates:
with q = b after fixation of S 0 after fixation of F .
As explained in section V.B of the main text, it is convenient to work with the continuous Markov process {n ≡ N/Ω, ξ} defined by
